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Abstract 
We examine the relation between mutual fund performance and gross flows for a large sample of 
actively managed U.S. mutual funds. Unlike previous studies that have only examined periods of 
generally increasing net flows, our sample includes periods of both increasing and decreasing net 
flows. We find that outflows are related to performance, with investors withdrawing money from poor 
performers. We also find that outflows and inflows respond asymmetrically to performance, outflows 
increase more aggressively following poor performance, and inflows increase more aggressively 
following good performance. Additionally, we find a symmetric performance net flow relation. 
 
1. Introduction 
The nonlinear relation between annual mutual fund performance and subsequent annual net flows is 
one of the best documented empirical regularities in mutual fund research. There are two explanations 
for the observed nonlinear relation between performance and net flows. The first argues that the 
nonlinearity results from a lack of a response to poor performance (e.g., Gruber, 1996; Lynch and 
Musto, 2003; Ivkovic and Weisbenner, 2009). These papers argue that investors fail to withdraw 
money from poorly performing funds for various rational and irrational reasons. The alternative 
explanation proposed by Huang, Wei and Yan (2007) switches the focus from a lack of a response to 
poor performance to a disproportionate response to good performance. Huang, Wei and Yan (2007) 
argue that participation costs make responding to lesser performance too costly.  
However, both of these explanations are based on examinations of net flows. We examine the 
performance gross flow relation to provide a more detailed picture of how investors respond to fund 
performance. Unlike earlier studies of gross flows that used limited nonrandom samples, we examine 
the gross flows of more than 3,200 actively managed domestic equity funds for the period 1997–2007. 
In addition to its sheer size, our sample offers the advantage of containing periods of both generally 
increasing and decreasing net flows. We find the following. First, existing investors punish poor 
performance by increasing outflows. Second, both outflows and inflows respond asymmetrically to 
performance—poor performance results in large outflows just as good performance results in large 
inflows. Third, net flows respond to both good and bad performance symmetrically; this result runs in 
stark contrast to the asymmetric relation between performance and net flows documented in prior 
studies. Finally, we find no evidence that participation costs influence the relation between 
performance and flows.  
Our results are of interest to academics and practitioners for several reasons. From an academic 
perspective, our findings offer a broader insight into the trading decisions of mutual fund investors. 
They suggest that the previously observed nonlinear relation between performance and net flows was 
not, in fact, driven by a lack of response of existing investors to bad performance, but more likely was 
driven by sample period and/or sample construction. As in unreported tests, limiting the sample to 
pre‐2003, we find a nonlinear performance flow relation consistent with prior research. Also, our 
results suggest that investors believe that fund performance signals managerial skill. That result 
confirms a basic assumption in models such as Berk and Green (2004). Finally, our results suggest that 
current investors continue to monitor mutual fund managers, withdrawing their money in response to 
poor performance, which is contrary to Johnson (2007).  
From a practitioner's perspective, understanding the relation between performance and flows is vital 
for business planning. Over the 12‐year period from 1989 to 2000, net flows to equity mutual funds 
increased from $6.8 billion to more than $309 billion (a 45‐fold increase, according to the Investment 
Company Institute's Fact Book, 2010). Since the peak in 2000, however, net flows have been declining. 
Results from previous studies potentially misrepresent the relation between performance and flows 
because of their sample periods. For example, two well‐known studies on the performance flow 
relation (Chevalier and Ellison, 1997; Sirri and Tufano, 1998) use samples from 1983 to 1993 and from 
1970 to 1990, respectively. Both studies only include periods of generally increasing net flows. More 
recent studies (e.g., Bergstresser and Poterba, 2002; Johnson, 2007; Ivkovic and Weisbenner, 2009) 
also examine periods of generally increasing net flows. Our results, based on a sample including both 
periods of increasing and decreasing net flows, suggest a different relation between performance and 
net flows. Specifically, that net flows respond symmetrically to performance. This result is important 
because the large demographic group of Baby Boomers is starting to transition from saving for 
retirement to spending (dis‐saving) in retirement, implying a general decline in net flows for the near 
term. That, in turn, suggests that the largely symmetric relation we observe between performance and 
net flows is likely to continue, at least through the end of the demographic cycle.  
2. Research background 
2.1. Lack of an outflow response to poor performance 
As noted earlier, there are two primary explanations for the nonlinear relation between performance 
and net flows. The first focuses on the nonresponsiveness of net flows to poor performance, arguing 
that existing investors fail to withdraw funds following poor performance. For example, Gruber (1996) 
suggests that there are two clienteles of mutual fund investors—sophisticated investors and 
disadvantaged investors. Disadvantaged investors fail to respond to poor performance because either 
they are influenced by factors other than return (such as advertising or advice from brokers) or they 
face some sort of friction that makes withdrawals costly. Investor heterogeneity produces the 
asymmetric performance net flow relation.1 
Rather than relying on investor heterogeneity, Lynch and Musto (2003) suggest that investors in poorly 
performing funds rationally choose not to withdraw their investment. They argue that following poor 
performance, fund sponsors will change the portfolio management strategy and/or the management 
team. Therefore, investors have no reason to believe that the poor performance will persist. Thus, 
current investors rationally choose not to withdraw their investment in poorly performing funds.  
Ivkovic and Weisbenner (2009) introduce the possibility that inactivity by existing investors in the face 
of poor performance is a manifestation of the disposition effect (e.g., Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; 
Shefrin and Statman, 1985). Specifically, investors may have an aversion to realizing losses, which leads 
them to leave their money in poorly performing funds.  
Results from previous empirical studies of gross flows generally are consistent with the notion that 
current investors in a fund fail to respond to poor performance. Bergstresser and Poterba (2002), 
Johnson (2007), and Ivkovic and Weisbenner (2009) all fail to find a relation between poor (relative) 
performance and outflows.2 However, it must be noted, that these studies examine limited 
nonrandom samples. For example, Bergstresser and Poterba (2002) only examine the 200 largest 
mutual funds. O’Neal (2004) contends that the relations observed in this sample may not be 
representative of the mutual fund universe, as a whole. Johnson (2007) studies less than ten funds, all 
from a single no‐load fund family. Ivkovic and Weisbenner (2009) examine only the trading behavior of 
retail investors within a single discount brokerage. Johnson (2007) presents evidence that mutual fund 
investors who use a discount brokerage house are not representative of the wider mutual fund 
investor universe, questioning the generalizability of Ivkovic and Weisbenner's (2009) findings. 
Additionally, Christoffersen, Evans and Musto (2007) argue that relying on account level data, like 
those used by Johnson (2007) and Ivkovic and Weisbenner (2009), is potentially problematic, as the 
samples are compiled using limited nonrandom samples of investors and funds.  
2.2. Inflow response to superior performance 
An alternative explanation for the nonlinear performance net flow relation focuses on new investors 
entering the fund in response to superior performance. Huang, Wei and Yan (2007) argue that 
investors use performance as a signal of managerial ability. Participation costs, however, make it 
rational to respond to only the best performance. The result is that investors are insensitive to poor 
and moderate performance and respond to only the best performance.  
2.3. An additional empirical study 
O’Neal (2004) examines the relation between performance and annual gross flows for the 200 largest 
mutual funds. He claims to “document that investors punish poor performance with increased 
redemptions.” Oddly, though, if punishing poor performance is defined as increasing outflows in 
response to poor performance, O’Neal (2004) finds no evidence that investors actually punish poor 
performance. What O’Neal (2004) does find is that outflows for funds with average and above‐average 
performance tend to decrease as performance increases (for certain measures of performance), with 
the negative relation being most pronounced for the best performing funds (see his table III). He finds 
no relation between performance and outflows among those funds with the worst performance. Thus, 
O’Neal's results are more appropriately characterized as evidence that investors reward good 
performance by reducing outflows rather than punish poor performance by increasing outflows. Other 
issues in O’Neal's analysis, however, lead us to be somewhat skeptical of that conclusion. Namely, 
O’Neal's results do not hold for risk‐adjusted returns or for standard measures of flows.  
3. Data 
Our sample was compiled using investment companies’ N‐SAR filings with the U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) and the CRSP Survivor‐Bias‐Free U.S. Mutual Fund Database. The SEC 
requires that all regulated investment companies file two N‐SARs each fiscal year, the N‐SARA covers 
the first six months of the investment company's fiscal year, and the N‐SARB covers the full fiscal year. 
We pull all N‐SARs from the SEC web site for the calendar years 1997 through 2007. Each N‐SAR filing 
identifies the dollar amounts of purchases, dividend purchases, other purchases, and redemptions for 
each month covered by the filing. We define net flows as investor purchases minus investor 
redemptions divided by the size of the fund at the beginning of the month.3 Inflows are investor 
purchases divided by fund size at the beginning of the month. Outflows are sales divided by fund size 
at the beginning of the month.4 
We utilize the CRSP database for fund returns. We estimate abnormal returns using the Fama‐French‐
Carhart four‐factor model.5 Factor loadings are estimated every month, for each fund, using the prior 
36 months’ returns.  
Matching the N‐SAR filings with CRSP is not a trivial undertaking. Fund's N‐SAR filings do not have a 
unique and consistent identifier through time. This forces us to manually compare various fund 
identifiers on each N‐SAR to create a series of N‐SAR filings for each fund. Once this was accomplished, 
we matched the N‐SAR time series to CRSP by manually comparing fund and family names across the 
two databases. Finally, to ensure the accuracy of our matching procedure, we compare the net asset 
value reported on the N‐SAR filing with that in the CRSP database.  
We eliminate observations that appear to contain data entry errors. Specifically, we eliminate 
observations where the net flow, inflow or outflow is greater than 50% of fund assets.6 Finally, we 
remove all funds that are not actively managed domestic equity funds. This results in a sample of 
88,910 fund‐month observations from 3,214 funds from April 1997 through December 2007.7 
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for returns and flows for our sample of domestic equity funds. As 
might be expected, mean and median raw quarterly returns (equal to 5.7% and 3.1%, respectively) 
exceed the four‐factor adjusted returns, which are essentially zero. Perhaps more interesting are the 
results on fund flows. The average monthly net flow is −0.02%, while the average inflow is 6.83%, and 
the average outflow is 6.85%.8 These averages suggest that net flows are small relative to inflows and 
outflows. Comparing the dollar amounts we see that net flows are roughly an order of magnitude less 
than both inflows and outflows.  
Table 1. Descriptive statistics The sample consists of 3,214 domestic equity mutual funds representing 
the CRSP Survivor‐Bias‐Free U.S. Mutual Fund Database and N‐SAR filings with the SEC. There are 
88,910 fund‐month observations for the period April 1997 to December 2007. Panel A presents the 
descriptive statistics of the fund's quarterly raw and abnormal returns. The abnormal return is the 
fund's Fama‐French‐Carhart four‐factor adjusted return, where the betas are estimated using a rolling 
36‐month window. Panel B presents descriptive statistics for the fund's monthly net flow and 
component flows. Net Flows is the amount of new money invested with the fund minus the amount of 
money withdrawn from the fund during a month, divided by the fund's total net assets at the 
beginning of the month. Inflow is the amount of new money invested with the fund over the month, 
divided by the fund's total net assets at the beginning of the month. Outflow is the amount of money 
withdrawn from the fund over the month, divided by the fund's total net assets at the beginning of the 
month.  
 Mean Median Maximum 75th Percentile 25th Percentile Minimum SD 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics for raw and abnormal returns  
Raw returns 0.057 0.031 0.828 0.135 −0.059 −0.547 0.741 
Abnormal returns 0.002 −0.0002 0.557 0.005 −0.004 −0.344 0.036 
Panel B: Descriptive statistics for dollar net flows inflows and outflows  
Net flows (1,000s)  2,073 −284 470,114 3,239 −4,110 −383,259 37,391 
Inflow (1,000s)  28,661 6,806 548,185 25,327 1,867 0 59,973 
Outflow (1,000s)  26,588 7,689 464,983 25,291 2,408 0 51,950 
Panel C: Descriptive statistics for net flows inflows and outflows  
Net flows  −0.0002 −0.003 0.491 0.018 −0.021 −0.497 0.073 
Inflow  0.0683 0.035 0.500 0.083 0.015 0 0.086 
Outflow  0.0685 0.036 0.500 0.079 0.019 0 0.084 
 
4. Empirical results 
4.1. Unconditional analysis 
The first step in our analysis is to examine the performance net flow relation at the monthly frequency. 
We repeat the analysis of Sirri and Tufano (1998, figure 1) by dividing funds into 20 groups based on 
their four‐factor adjusted return, and calculate the mean net flow for the subsequent month (see 
Figure 1). The net flow results for the best performing funds are consistent with those of Sirri and 
Tufano (1998)—there is a large jump in net flows for the best performing funds. This is consistent with 
the long‐held belief that the performance net flow relation is asymmetric. What is different about our 
Figure 1 relative to Sirri and Tufano's figure 1, is that our net flows display a rather consistent decline 
as performance degrades from the 19th performance bucket to the second performance bucket, 
whereas net flows are relatively constant in Sirri and Tufano's sample from the first performance 
bucket to the 13th performance bucket. More notably, however, mean net flows drop dramatically in 
our sample for the worst performing funds, whereas there is no such drop in net flows in the Sirri and 
Tufano sample.9 We interpret the results in Figure 1 as suggesting that net flows respond to 
performance over the broad range of performance, but are particularly sensitive to both very good, 
and very bad performance. However, we are able to replicate much more closely Sirri and Tufano's 
(1998) figure 1, when we limit our sample to a period of generally increasing net flows (unreported).  
Figure 1  
Performance flow relation Each month, mutual funds were ranked among 20 groups based on their 
monthly performance. We report the mean net flow for each group over the subsequent month.  
4.2. Multivariate analysis of net flows 
To conduct a more formal evaluation of the nonlinearity in monthly flows, we examine the 
performance net flow relation in a regression model. Following Sirri and Tufano (1998) we measure 
performance using fractile rankings. Each month, we rank funds based on their prior quarter four‐
factor adjusted performance, ranking funds from zero for the worst performing fund to one for the 
best performing fund. We then spread each fund's performance ranking across terciles, worst 
performance, middle performance and best performance, and estimate a piecewise linear 
regression.10 What this means is that if a fund has a performance ranking of 0.85, then worst 
performance is 0.33, middle performance is 0.33, and best performance is 0.19. A fund with a 
performance ranking of 0.4 would have a worst performance of 0.33, a middle performance of 0.07, 
and a best performance of 0.00.  
Following Sirri and Tufano (1998), we control for fund expenses, 12b‐1 fees, and the standard deviation 
of the funds’ monthly (abnormal) return over the prior 12 months. We also control for trading fees 
associated with entering and leaving the fund, as it seems likely that frictions associated with trading 
may affect flows. Rather than using an indicator variable capturing the presence of a fee (front‐end 
loads, contingent deferred sales charges, and redemption fees), we compute effective measures for 
each type of trading fee. We calculate our effective fee measure by dividing the total dollar amount 
collected under the fee by the total amount of trading that could be subjected to the fee.11 For 
example, to calculate our measure of effective front‐end loads we divide the dollar amount of front‐
end loads collected by the total amount of inflows during the six‐month reporting period.12 Using this 
methodology, we calculate effective front‐end loads, effective back‐end loads, and effective 
redemption fees. Also, Del Guercio and Tkac (2002), Coval and Stafford (2007), and Jaiprakash and 
Kumar (2009) find meaningful persistence in mutual fund net flows. Accordingly, we control for lagged 
flows in our analysis.13 Finally, while we conduct both Fama‐MacBeth and pooled ordinary least 
squares (OLS) analysis, we only report our Fama‐MacBeth findings, as Coval and Stafford (2007) find 
that the Fama‐MacBeth coefficient estimates are more precise than pooled OLS estimates. We note 
that our pooled OLS results are statistically, and qualitatively similar to our Fama‐MacBeth results.  
We present the results of our monthly net flow analysis in Table 2. The results confirm those in Figure 
1. Consistent with prior research, we find that net flows are sensitive to performance for the best 
performing funds. For funds in the middle tercile of performance, there is a positive relation between 
performance and flows, but the relation is only marginally significant. Our findings with respect to 
poorly performing funds are likely the most interesting, however. We find that there is a significant 
positive relation between performance and net flows for the worst performing funds, implying that 
poorly performing funds experience lower net flows. While prior research on the performance net flow 
relation has documented a much stronger reaction to performance among the best performing funds 
than among the worst performing funds, we find no evidence that net flows respond more aggressively 
to good performance than to bad in unreported tests. However, if we limit our sample to a period of 
generally increasing net flows (unreported), we find evidence that net flows respond more aggressively 
to good performance than poor performance, which is consistent with prior studies. This suggests that, 
potentially the asymmetric net flow response to performance is an artifact of the samples examined.  
Table 2. The relation between performance and net flows This table presents our Fama‐MacBeth 
analysis of the relation between fund performance and the subsequent net flows. The dependent 
variable is Net Flow, which is the amount of new money invested in the fund minus the amount of 
money withdrawn from the fund over a month, divided by the size of the fund at the beginning of the 
month. We measure prior quarter performance using the fractile ranking of the funds Fama‐French‐
Carhart four‐factor adjusted returns, where the adjustment is based on rolling betas estimates over the 
prior 36 months. Worst performance tercile is defined as Min (Rank, 0.33). Middle performance tercile 
is defined as Min (0.33, Rank – Worst). Best performance tercile is defined as Rank – Middle – Worst. 
LnSize is the natural log of the fund's total net asset at the beginning of the month. StdRet is the 
standard deviation of the fund's abnormal monthly returns over the previous 12 months. ExpenseRatio 
is the expense ratio over the six‐month N‐SAR reporting period. EffectiveFrontLoad is the money that 
the fund collected from the front‐end load over the six‐month reporting period, divided by the amount 
of new money flowing into the fund over the same six‐month reporting period. 
EffectiveRedemptionFee is the money generated from the fund's redemption fee over the six‐month 
reporting period, divided by the amount of money withdrawn from the fund during the same six‐
month reporting period. EffectiveCDSC is the money collected from the fund's contingent deferred 
sales charges over the six‐month reporting period, divided by the amount of money withdrawn from 
the fund during the same six‐month reporting period. 12b‐1 Fee is the money generated for the fund 
from 12b‐1 fees over the six‐month reporting period, divided by the size of the fund at the time of the 
N‐SAR filing. Lagged Net flows represent lags 1 through 12 of the dependent variable. t‐Statistics are in 
parentheses.  
Intercept −0.005** 
 (−2.60) 
Worst performance tercile  0.021*** 
 (5.71) 
Middle performance tercile  0.005* 
 (1.77) 
Best performance tercile  0.028*** 
 (7.32) 
LnSize  −0.001*** 
 (−3.76) 
StdRet  −0.032 
 (−1.20) 
ExpenseRatio  −0.202*** 
 (−3.30) 
EffectiveFrontLoad  −0.009 
 (−0.45) 
EffectiveRedemptionFee  −25.11 
 (−0.68) 
EffectiveCDSC  0.343*** 
 (3.64) 
12b‐1 Fee  0.018 
 (0.13) 
Lagged net flows included? Yes 
Adjusted R2 
0.4846 
 
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level, respectively.  
4.3. Multivariate analysis of gross flows 
Having examined the relation between performance and net flows, we assess the performance of gross 
flow relations. O’Neal (2004) finds evidence that a portion of mutual fund inflows and outflows are 
related to the contemporaneous flow in the opposite direction. Additionally, recent research suggests 
that traders can quickly move in and out of a mutual fund, with potentially meaningful effects on the 
observed flow patterns (Chalmers, Edelen and Kadlec, 2001; Greene and Hodges, 2002; Zitzewitz, 
2006).14 Accordingly, we control for flows in the opposite direction, when we examine the relation 
between performance and gross flows. Our results are reported in Table 3.  
Table 3. The relation between performance and gross flows This table presents our Fama‐MacBeth 
analysis of the relation between performance and gross flow (outflow and inflow). The dependent 
variable in column 1 is Outflow, which is the amount of money withdrawn from the fund over a month, 
divided by the size of the fund at the beginning of the month. The dependent variable in column 2 is 
Inflow, which is the amount of new money invested with the fund over the month, divided by the size 
of the fund at the beginning of the month. We measure prior quarter performance using the fractile 
ranking of the funds Fama‐French‐Carhart four‐factor adjusted returns, where the adjustment is based 
on rolling betas estimates over the prior 36 months. Worst performance tercile is defined as Min (Rank, 
0.33). Middle performance tercile is defined as Min (0.33, Rank – Worst). Best performance tercile is 
defined as Rank – Middle – Worst. LnSize is the natural log of the fund's total net asset at the beginning 
of the month. StdRet is the standard deviation of the fund's abnormal monthly returns over the 
previous 12 months. ExpenseRatio is the expense ratio over the six‐month N‐SAR reporting period. 
EffectiveFrontLoad is the money that the fund collected from the front‐end load over the six‐month 
reporting period, divided by the amount of new money flowing into the fund over the same six‐month 
reporting period. EffectiveRedemptionFee is the money generated from the fund's redemption fee over 
the six‐month reporting period, divided by the amount of money withdrawn from the fund during the 
same six‐month reporting period. EffectiveCDSC is the money collected from the fund's contingent 
deferred sales charges over the six‐month reporting period, divided by the amount of money 
withdrawn from the fund during the same six‐month reporting period. 12b‐1 Fee is the money 
generated for the fund from 12b‐1 fees over the six‐month reporting period, divided by the size of the 
fund at the time of the N‐SAR filing. Lagged Outflows and Lagged Inflows represent lags 1 through 12 
of the dependent variables. Contemporaneous Inflow and Contemporaneous Outflow represent the 
column 2 and 1 dependent variables, respectively. t‐Statistics are in parentheses.  
 Outflow Inflow 
Intercept 0.009*** −0.0003 
 (6.54) (−0.23) 
Worst performance tercile  −0.021*** 0.012*** 
 (−7.93) (4.24) 
Middle performance tercile  −0.004* 0.001 
 (−1.85) (0.51) 
Best performance tercile  −0.010*** 0.023*** 
 (−3.86) (6.78) 
LnSize  −0.0001 −0.0004*** 
 (−1.48) (−4.27) 
StdRet  0.002 −0.057** 
 (0.10) (−2.49) 
ExpenseRatio  0.149** −0.167*** 
 (2.49) (−3.14) 
EffectiveFrontLoad  −0.057*** −0.023 
 (−4.12) (−1.47) 
EffectiveRedemptionFee  64.720* 11.660 
 (1.81) (0.23) 
EffectiveCDSC  −0.348*** 0.165* 
 (−4.68) (1.82) 
12b‐1 Fee  −0.060 0.033 
 (−0.46) (0.34) 
 Outflow Inflow 
Contemporaneous inflow  0.185***  
 (17.10)  
Contemporaneous outflow   0.206*** 
  (15.50) 
Lagged outflows included? Yes No 
Lagged inflows included? No Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.6854 0.7096 
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level, respectively.  
The first thing to note in column 1 of Table 3 is that, unlike previous research, we document a relation 
between relative performance and outflows. In particular, we find that as performance declines, 
current investors punish poorly performing funds with larger withdrawals. Our coefficient estimate for 
the worst performance tercile implies that a fund going from the 33rd percentile to the lowest 
percentile would suffer an almost 9% increase in outflows (relative to the average fund's monthly 
outflows).15 It is important to remember that this is the flow for one month. Given the persistence in 
flows, the total effect will be much larger over time. This result stands in stark contrast to prior 
examinations of the performance outflow relation; as mentioned earlier, Bergstresser and Poterba 
(2002), Johnson (2007), and Ivkovic and Weisbenner (2009) all find no relation between relative 
performance and outflows. This result also contradicts Johnson's (2007) conclusion that current 
investors stop monitoring fund managers once they have invested in the fund.  
Also of interest are investors’ reactions to good performance. We can see that among the best 
performing funds there is a negative relation between performance and outflows. This implies that 
current investors withdraw less from better performing funds. However, we find that the outflow 
response to performance is asymmetric with the response to poor performance being stronger than 
the response to good performance.16 
Results on our control variables largely are consistent with expectations. In particular, outflows 
increase with expense ratios (the cost of staying in a fund) and decrease with fund transactions costs 
(the expense to get out of the fund). Like O’Neal (2004), we find that contemporaneous inflows are an 
important determinant of fund outflows.  
We also examine the determinants of fund inflows. Our results are threefold. First, we find that among 
the best performing funds there is a positive relation between performance and inflows, which is 
consistent with prior research. Second, and more surprisingly, we also find that there is a significant 
positive relation between performance and inflows for the worst performing funds—investors invest 
less in poorly performing funds. This result suggests that potential investors also are reacting to poor 
performance. Third, we find that there is a statistically significant difference between the coefficients 
for the best and worst performing funds (p‐value = 0.015). Like outflows, inflows respond 
asymmetrically to fund performance.  
Results on our control variables are generally consistent with our expectations. As was the case with 
outflows, the concurrent cross flow is an important determinant of inflows. Additionally, funds with 
higher expense ratios experience lower levels of inflows. More surprisingly, though, we find some 
(albeit weak) evidence that higher deferred sales charges increase fund inflows. While this result may 
appear surprising, one possibility is that loads associated with leaving a fund serve to screen out short‐
term investors (e.g., Chordia, 1996; Nanda, Narayanan and Warther, 2000). Johnson (2004) finds that 
the liquidity needs of short‐term investors represent a significant cost to long‐term investors. Perhaps, 
then, our finding reflects long‐term investors rationally choosing funds with higher transaction fees, 
and fewer short‐term investors.17 
The outflow and inflow results are represented graphically in Figure 2. The horizontal axis is the 
performance fractile ranking from zero to one while the vertical axis captures gross flow scaled by the 
expected flow to a fund with average performance. Note that the worst performing funds (lowest 
percentile) experience outflows which are more than 12.4% higher than the average fund, while the 
best performing (highest percentile) fund's outflows are 6.6% less than outflows at the average fund. 
Among the tercile of worst performing funds, going from the 33rd percentile to the lowest percentile 
of performance implies outflows increase by 11.4% of the average fund's outflows.  
 
Figure 2  
Estimated performance gross flow relation This figure depicts the relation between performance and 
mutual fund gross flows. Gross flows are estimated using the coefficients reported in Table 3; all 
nonperformance variables are set equal to their mean while performance changes from 0 to 1. 
Estimated gross flows are scaled by their respective means.  
A similar, but somewhat less pronounced pattern exists for inflows. The worst performing funds 
experience inflows which are 91.9% of the mean fund's inflows, while the best performing funds 
experience inflows that are 15.5% greater than the mean funds. Among the best performing funds, 
moving from the 66th percentile to the 100th percentile implies an increase in inflows from 100.4% of 
the mean fund's inflows to 115.5%. Like outflows, the relation between performance and inflows 
appears to be economically, as well as statistically significant.  
Overall, our analysis shows that investors respond to both good and bad performance. Current 
investors increase their withdrawals when funds do poorly. Additionally, current investors decrease 
their withdrawals for those funds that have done well. The outflow response to good and bad 
performance is asymmetric, with current investors responding more to bad performance than to good 
performance. Our results for inflows, are similar, but in the opposite direction. Inflows respond 
asymmetrically to good and bad performance, but the response to good performance is stronger than 
the response to bad performance. Finally, net flows respond symmetrically to performance.18 
5. Additional analysis 
In this section, we first discuss the role of participation costs in driving the nonlinear performance net 
flow relation. Next, we provide evidence on investor reactions to fund performance at different time 
intervals and flow periodicity. Finally, we reconsider our analysis using an alternative measure of 
performance.  
5.1. Evidence on participation costs 
Huang, Wei and Yan (2007) suggest that new investors drive the nonlinearity between performance 
and net flows. In their model, new investors consider performance as an indicator of managerial 
quality, but participation costs mitigate the response to any performance other than the very best, 
thus driving the observed nonlinear relation between performance and net flows. They argue that the 
response to moderate performance should be greater for funds with lower participation costs, and 
they find evidence consistent with this explanation.  
However, Huang, Wei and Yan (2007) do not analyze gross flows—they can only rely on net flows to 
draw conclusions about new investor responses to fund performance. Because we have inflow data, 
we are able to make a more direct test of their theory. Inflows are a better measure of new investor 
activity than net flows because, unlike net flows, inflows are not influenced by the redemption 
behavior of existing investors. We use three of Huang, Wei and Yan's (2007) proxies for low 
participation costs: (1) expense ratios plus one‐seventh of the front‐end load, (2) fund family size, and 
(3) the number of fund styles offered by the fund family. We examine the relation between 
performance and inflows as a function of participation costs in Table 4. Regardless of the choice of 
participation cost proxy, we find no evidence that participation costs affect the performance inflow 
relation.  
Table 4. The effect of participation costs on the performance inflow relation This table presents our 
Fama‐MacBeth analysis of the effect of participation cost on the performance inflow relation. The 
dependent variable is Inflow, which is the amount of new money invested in the fund over a month, 
divided by the size of the fund at the beginning of the month. The independent variables of interest are 
the performance terciles, and the interaction of the performance terciles with the Huang, Wei and Yan 
(2007) low participation cost proxies. We measure prior quarter performance using the fractile ranking 
of the funds Fama‐French‐Carhart four‐factor adjusted returns, where the adjustment is based on 
rolling betas estimates over the prior 36 months. Worst performance tercile is defined as Min (Rank, 
0.33). Middle performance tercile is defined as Min (0.33, Rank – Worst). Best performance tercile is 
defined as Rank – Middle – Worst. Following Huang, Wei and Yan (2007), we use Fees, Family Size, and 
Family Styles to simulate low participation costs. Fees is an indicator set equal to 1 if the expense ratio 
plus one‐seventh of the front‐end load is above the median fee level. Family Size is an indicator set 
equal to 1 if the fund's size is greater than the median. Family Styles is an indicator that is set equal to 
1 if the number of investment styles the fund's family offers is greater than the median number. 
Contemporaneous Outflows are the fund's outflows for the same month as the inflows. Lagged Inflows 
represent lags 1 through 12 of the dependent variables. The other independent variables are the same 
as in Table 3. t‐Statistics are in parentheses.  
 Inflows Inflows Inflows 
Worst performance tercile  0.011*** 0.009** 0.014*** 
 (3.45) (2.48) (3.23) 
Middle performance tercile  0.003 0.0003 0.006 
 (0.98) (0.094) (0.91) 
Best performance tercile  0.018*** 0.026*** −0.0681 
 (3.74) (4.70) (−1.06) 
Worst Tercile × Fee  0.002   
 (0.66)   
Middle Tercile × Fee  −0.004   
 (−1.31)   
Best Tercile × Fee  0.009*   
 (1.89)   
Worst Tercile × Family Size   0.0031  
  (1.21)  
Middle Tercile × Family Size   0.001  
  (0.35)  
Best Tercile × Family Size   −0.002  
  (−0.37)  
Worst Tercile × Family Styles    −0.004 
   (−0.90) 
Middle Tercile × Family Styles    −0.006 
   (−0.82) 
Best Tercile × Family Styles    0.090 
   (1.40) 
Contemporaneous outflows included Yes Yes Yes 
Lagged inflows included? Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.7097 0.7107 0.7208 
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level, respectively.  
5.2. Evidence from other performance and flow windows 
One potential concern is that our results may not be generalizable; that is our result may only be 
descriptive of investors who evaluate quarterly performance. We repeat all of our analysis using 
semiannual and annual performance. For brevity, we leave the results untabulated.19 Even at longer 
performance evaluation windows, outflows and inflows demonstrate the same asymmetry discussed in 
Table 3. Investors punish poor performance by increasing outflows (and decreasing inflows) and 
reward good performance by reducing outflows (and increasing inflows). Thus, we conclude that our 
results are not driven by our choice of a quarterly performance evaluation period.  
Additionally, we repeat all of our analysis using quarterly performance and quarterly flows instead of 
quarterly performance and monthly flows. We report our quarterly outflow and inflow results in 
Table 5. The results mirror those from our monthly analysis. We continue to see that current investors 
punish poor performance by withdrawing money and reward good performance by reducing their 
withdrawals from funds that have done well. Similarly, we see that current and potential investors 
reward funds for good performance by increasing their purchases of fund shares while at the same 
time punishing poor performance by reducing their purchases.  
Table 5. The relation between performance and quarterly gross flows This table presents our Fama‐
MacBeth analysis of the relation between quarterly performance and quarterly gross flow (outflow and 
inflow). The dependent variable in column 1 is Outflow, which is the amount of money withdrawn from 
the fund over a quarter, divided by the size of the fund at the beginning of the quarter. The dependent 
variable in column 2 is Inflow, which is the amount of new money invested with the fund over the 
quarter, divided by the size of the fund at the beginning of the quarter. We measure prior quarter 
performance using the fractile ranking of the funds Fama‐French‐Carhart four‐factor adjusted returns, 
where the adjustment is based on rolling betas estimates over the prior 36 months. Worst 
performance tercile is defined as Min (Rank, 0.33). Middle performance tercile is defined as Min (0.33, 
Rank – Worst). Best performance tercile is defined as Rank – Middle – Worst. LnSize is the natural log of 
the fund's total net asset at the beginning of the quarter. StdRet is the standard deviation of the fund's 
abnormal monthly returns over the previous 12 months. ExpenseRatio is the expense ratio over the six‐
month N‐SAR reporting period. EffectiveFrontLoad is the money that the fund collected from the front‐
end load over the six‐month reporting period, divided by the amount of new money flowing into the 
fund over the same six‐month reporting period. EffectiveRedemptionFee is the money generated from 
the fund's redemption fee over the six‐month reporting period, divided by the amount of money 
withdrawn from the fund during the same six‐month reporting period. EffectiveCDSC is the money 
collected from the fund's contingent deferred sales charges over the six‐month reporting period, 
divided by the amount of money withdrawn from the fund during the same six‐month reporting 
period. 12b‐1 Fee is the money generated for the fund from 12b‐1 fees over the six‐month reporting 
period, divided by the size of the fund at the time of the N‐SAR filing. Lagged Outflows and Inflows 
represent lags 1 through 4 of the dependent variables. t‐Statistics are in parentheses.  
 Outflows Inflows 
Intercept 0.039*** −0.002 
 (5.37) (−0.21) 
Worst performance tercile  −0.067*** 0.042*** 
 (−4.10) (3.45) 
Middle performance tercile  −0.012 0.022* 
 (−1.03) (1.86) 
Best performance tercile  −0.024* 0.075*** 
 (−1.79) (3.89) 
lnSize  −0.001 −0.001** 
 (−1.45) (−2.61) 
StdRet  −0.092 −0.136 
 (−0.84) (−1.39) 
 Outflows Inflows 
ExpenseRatio  0.140 −0.988*** 
 (0.48) (−3.03) 
EffectiveFrontLoad  −0.177** −0.043 
 (−2.29) (−0.57) 
EffectiveRedemptionFee  73.180 −47.210 
 (1.13) (−1.10) 
EffectiveCDSC  −1.802*** 0.650 
 (−4.46) (1.37) 
12b‐1 Fee  1.124* 0.793 
 (1.86) (1.45) 
Contemporaneous inflows  0.240***  
 (12.80)  
Contemporaneous outflows   0.267*** 
  (11.00) 
Lagged outflows included? Yes No 
Lagged inflows included? No Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.7248 0.7233 
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level, respectively.  
Column 1 of Table 5 also shows that the response of outflows to the worst performance is greater than 
the response of outflows to good performance. We see that the coefficient on the worst performance 
tercile is −0.067 and the coefficient on the best performance tercile is −0.024. The difference is 
statistically significant (p‐value = 0.041). Again, this evidence runs contrary to the notion that current 
investors are essentially indifferent to poor performance.  
We note that there is some difference between these results from our earlier results with respect to 
inflows. Like our earlier results, inflows react to both good and bad performance. What is different, 
however, is that the reaction is no longer obviously asymmetric. The coefficient for the best 
performing funds is 0.075 while the coefficient for the worst performing funds is only 0.042. The 
difference is not statistically significant (p‐value = 0.162).  
5.3. Evidence using style‐adjusted returns 
We compare a fund's performance to all other funds in our sample throughout our study. It could be 
that investors are more interested in how a fund performs relative to other funds with the same style. 
To explore this possibility we rank each fund's quarterly performance against only those funds with the 
same self‐reported style, instead of against all the funds in our sample. The results are presented in 
Table 6.  
Table 6. Style ranked performance This table presents our Fama‐MacBeth analysis of the relation 
between quarterly performance and quarterly gross flow (outflow and inflow). The dependent variable 
in column 2 is Outflow, which is the amount of money withdrawn from the fund over a quarter, divided 
by the size of the fund at the beginning of the quarter. The dependent variable in column 3 is Inflow, 
which is the amount of new money invested with the fund over the quarter, divided by the size of the 
fund at the beginning of the quarter. We measure prior quarter performance using the fractile ranking 
of the funds Fama‐French‐Carhart four‐factor adjusted returns, where the adjustment is based on 
rolling betas estimates over the prior 36 months. Each fund is ranked against all other funds within its 
investment strategy. Worst Style‐performance tercile is defined as Min (Rank, 0.33). Middle Style‐
performance tercile is defined as Min (0.33, Rank – Worst). Best Style‐performance tercile is defined as 
Rank – Middle – Worst. LnSize is the natural log of the fund's total net asset at the beginning of the 
quarter. StdRet is the standard deviation of the fund's abnormal monthly returns over the previous 12 
months. ExpenseRatio is the expense ratio over the six‐month N‐SAR reporting period. 
EffectiveFrontLoad is the money that the fund collected from the front‐end load over the six‐month 
reporting period, divided by the amount of new money flowing into the fund over the same six‐month 
reporting period. EffectiveRedemptionFee is the money generated from the fund's redemption fee over 
the six‐month reporting period, divided by the amount of money withdrawn from the fund during the 
same six‐month reporting period. EffectiveCDSC is the money collected from the fund's contingent 
deferred sales charges over the six‐month reporting period, divided by the amount of money 
withdrawn from the fund during the same six‐month reporting period. 12b‐1 Fee is the money 
generated for the fund from 12b‐1 fees over the six‐month reporting period, divided by the size of the 
fund at the time of the N‐SAR filing. Lagged Outflows and Inflows represent lags 1 through 4 of the 
dependent variables. t‐Statistics are in parentheses.  
 Net flow Outflow Inflow 
Intercept −0.005*** 0.007*** −0.0003 
 (−3.69) (5.62) (−0.22) 
Worst Style‐performance tercile  0.020*** −0.016*** 0.009*** 
 (5.91) (−5.86) (3.66) 
Middle Style‐performance tercile  0.006** −0.006*** 0.003 
 (2.59) (−3.15) (1.61) 
Best Style‐performance tercile  0.016*** −0.006*** 0.013*** 
 (5.87) (−2.93) (5.69) 
LnSize  −0.0004*** −0.0001 −0.0004*** 
 (−3.64) (−0.89) (−4.47) 
StdRet  −0.014 0.006 −0.036* 
 (−0.57) (0.27) (−1.69) 
ExpenseRatio  −0.187*** 0.161*** −0.150*** 
 (−3.07) (2.69) (−2.83) 
EffectiveFrontLoad  −0.008 −0.062*** −0.026 
 (−0.42) (−4.42) (−1.64) 
EffectiveRedemptionFee  −33.101 76.678* 9.481 
 (−0.93) (1.78) (0.21) 
EffectiveCDSC  0.359*** −0.352*** 0.169* 
 (3.83) (−4.88) (1.83) 
12b‐1 Fee  −0.020 −0.068 0.0004 
 Net flow Outflow Inflow 
 (−0.14) (−0.52) (0.00) 
Contemporaneous inflows   0.182***  
  (16.99)  
Contemporaneous outflows    0.204*** 
   (15.44) 
Lagged net flows included? Yes No No 
Lagged outflows included? No Yes No 
Lagged inflows included? No No Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.4820 0.6845 0.7082 
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level, respectively.  
Those results are consistent with those reported earlier. Similar to the results presented in Table 2 we 
find that net flows respond to both the best and worst performance. We again fail to find evidence of 
an asymmetric response to performance.  
Examining the relation between gross flows and relative style performance reveals results similar to 
those presented in Table 3. We find that outflows are more sensitive to the worst performance than to 
the best performance. While inflows are sensitive to both the worst and best performance, unlike in 
Table 3, we find no evidence that inflows are more sensitive to the best performance. In general the 
results presented in Table 6 support our earlier findings.  
6. Conclusion 
One of the best documented empirical regularities in mutual fund research is the nonlinear relation 
between past performance and net flows. We re‐examine that relation, as well as the relations 
between performance and the two components of net flows (outflows and inflows) using a large 
sample of equity funds over a period that includes both increasing and decreasing net flows.  
We find that net flows respond symmetrically to performance. Investors respond to both good and bad 
performance in a similar way. This result runs contrary to current research, which suggests that net 
flows respond to good performance, but not to bad performance.  
Second, we find that outflows respond to performance, as well. Specifically, current investors 
withdraw more from poorly performing funds, while they withdraw less from funds with better 
performance. While outflows respond to both good and bad performance, the response is asymmetric. 
Outflows more likely increase as a result of poor performance, than decrease as a result of good 
performance.  
Finally, we find that inflows respond to both good and bad performance. Previous research has 
suggested that while inflows are responsive to good performance, they are not affected by bad 
performance. We find that inflows are indeed affected by bad performance. Like outflows, however, 
the response of inflows to good and bad performance is asymmetric. Increases in inflows resulting 
from good performance are greater than the reductions in performance stemming from poor 
performance.  
Footnotes 
1 Berk and Tonks (2007), in explaining persistence in poor fund performance, embrace the assumption 
of heterogeneity in investor sensitivity to poor performance. Their argument is that investors differ in 
their sensitivities to poor fund performance. When low‐skill managers produce inferior performance, 
investors with high performance sensitivities leave the fund; the remaining investors are largely 
insensitive to performance. When the low‐quality manager produces inferior performance again, 
there is no response from existing investors, as only performance‐insensitive investors remain in the 
fund. Christoffersen and Musto (2002) make a similar argument.  
2 While these studies find no evidence of a relation between relative performance and outflows they 
do find some evidence that outflows are tax motivated.  
3 We note that the correlation between our net flow measure, and the Sirri and Tufano (1998) net flow 
proxy is 0.501, in our sample. Sirri and Tufano (1998) calculate net flows as {TNAt−[TNAt–1× (1 + 
Returnt)]} / TNAt–1.  
4 This is the same measure of gross flows used by Bergstresser and Poterba (2002), O’Neal (2004), 
Johnson (2007), and Christoffersen, Evans and Musto (2007).  
5 The Fama‐French three factors and the momentum factor were downloaded from Kenneth French's 
web site: http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html.  
6 Additionally, we drop observations with an effective expense ratio, a redemption fee, or a 12b‐1 fee 
above 2%, or an effective front‐end load, or deferred sales fee above 7%.  
7 Our sample starts in 1997 because electronic N‐SAR filings were not mandatory prior to 1997.  
8 Our net flow average is comparable to the Sirri and Tufano (1998) calculated mean (median) net 
flows of 0.13% (0.07%).  
9 The average monthly net flow following performance in the top bucket is slightly more than 1.8% of 
fund assets. On an annual basis, this would imply a net flow of approximately 21.6% of fund assets, 
consistent with Sirri and Tufano (1998).  
10 To make sure our results are not driven by setting our breakpoints at the 33rd and 67th percentiles 
of performance, we also try several other breakpoint specifications. (e.g., 20–60–20, 10–80–10) and 
find similar results. Additionally, our results hold when we measure performance using single‐factor 
adjusted returns, as well as raw returns.  
11 The N‐SAR provides us with the dollar amount of each type of trading fee collected over each six‐
month reporting period.  
12 Thus, a particular fund will have the same values for effective fees for six consecutive monthly 
observations.  
13 We do not control for persistence in performance since there is no evidence of equity fund 
performance persistence in the research. However, there is some evidence on performance 
persistence in bond funds that has been documented by Polwitoon and Tawatnuntachai (2008).  
14 Chalmers, Edelen and Kadlec (2001), Greene and Hodges (2002), and Zitzewitz (2006) use daily flow 
data from TrimTabs to demonstrate the ability of these traders to systematically transfer wealth 
from long‐term investors to themselves. The TrimTabs data capture flows for a small subset of 
mutual funds (about 12% of U.S. open‐end funds [Zitzewitz (2006)]) over a relatively brief period of 
time [e.g., Zitzewitz's (2006) sample covers January 1998 to October 2001].  
15 The average fund has mean size, all control variables set to their means, and average performance.  
16 In unreported tests we compare the outflow response to the worst and best performance. We find 
that the difference is statistically significant with a p‐value of 0.0033.  
17 The importance of long‐term investors to the performance inflow relation is evident, as the 
Investment Company Institute (2009) reports that about two‐thirds of all mutual fund investments 
(gross inflows) are made through employer‐sponsored retirement plans.  
18 One may worry that these results reflect the trading of mutual fund timers. In untabulated tests we 
explore this issue by removing growth funds from the sample, as these are the domestic funds most 
likely to be targeted by timers. We find that removing growth funds does not qualitatively change 
our results.  
19 The complete tabulated results are available from the authors on request.  
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